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This study has been carried out on 25 different economies so as to determine 
how much central banks give place to federal reserve in reaction functions and 
to what extent this reaction changed with the effect of the financial crisis of 
2008. The model to which federal funds rate was added as an independent 
variable was tested with OLS econometric method separately for 2000-2007 
and 2008-2014 periods. According to the empirical evidence, the reaction of 
most of the countries to the US economy, which is the leading country of the 
world's biggest economies, turned out to be statistically 5% significant at the 
level of significance. However, together with this reaction's continuation for 
many countries after the crisis, it changed dramatically for each country when    
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examined country-by-country. In addition, time varying regression method was  
used in this study so as to both differentiate it from literature and also to 
confirm the results with a different method. First findings were accordingly 
strengthened with the obtained results. 
Keywords: Monetary Policy, Taylor Rule, Time Varying Regression, Zero        
                    Lower Bound 
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ÖZET 
 
 
                    MERKEZ BANKALARININ SIFIR ALT  
ÇİZGİSİNDE FEDERAL RESERVE’E TEPKİLERİ 
 
 
      GÜNER, Ümit 
Yüksek Lisans, Ekonomi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Bedri K. Onur TAŞ 
 
  Temmuz 2016 
 
 
 
Bu çalışma; merkez bankalarının tepki fonksiyonlarında federal reserve e ne 
ağırlıkta yer verdiklerinin ve bu tepkinin 2008 finansal kriziyle ne ölçüde 
değiştiğini tespit etmeyi amaıyla 25 farklı ekonomi üzerinde 
yürütülmüştür.Federal funds rate in bağımsız değişken olarak eklendiği model 
2000-2007 ve 2008-2014  dönemleri için ayrı ayrı sıradan en küçük karaler 
ekonometrik metoduyla test edilmiştir. Ampirik bulgulara göre ülkerin çoğu , 
dünyanın en büyük ekonomilerinin başında gelen ABD ekonomisine verilen  
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tepki %5 anlamlılık düzeyinde istatistiki olarak anlamlı çıkmıştır. Ancak bu 
tepki kriz sonrası dönemde birçok ülke için devam etmekle beraber; ülke ülke 
incelediğinde her biri için önemli ölçüde değişikliğe uğramıştır. Ayrıca 
çalışmada; hem literatürden farklılaştırmak  hem de sonuçları farklı bi 
yöntemle teyit etmek için zamanla değişen regression yöntemi de 
kullanılmıştır.Elde edilen sonuçlarla ilk bulgularla sağlamlaştırılmıştır. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Para Politikası,Taylor Kuralı, Zamanla Değişen    
                                  Regresyen, Sıfır Alt Çizgisi  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viii 
  
 
 
   
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
 
 
 
Even though just my name comes out on the cover of this thesis, lots of 
people have contributed to its production. I owe my appreciation to all those 
people who have made this thesis possible and by dint of whom my graduate 
experience has been one that I will eternize forever. 
I would like to express my profound gratitude to my supervisor, Assoc. 
Prof. Bedri Kamil Onur TAŞ. I have been astonishingly lucky to have an 
advisor who gave me the freedom to explore on my own and at the same time 
the guidance to pull through when my steps faltered. His expertise, 
understanding, patience, and support helped me overcome many crisis 
situations and finish this dissertation. I would like to thank him to his guidance 
and his exemplary stance as a young and successful economist to me. I hope 
that one day I would become as good an advisor to my students as my 
supervisor has been to me. 
Besides my advisor, I would like to thank Assoc. Professor Türkmen 
GÖKSEL, the other member of my committee, for insightful comments, 
constructive criticisms and tips to become a better scientist. I am grateful to 
him for holding me to a high research standard and for letting my defense be an 
enjoyable moment.  
ix 
  
 
 
   
I am also grateful to Asst. Prof. Ozan EKŞİ, the last member of my 
committee, for his encouragement and practical advice. I am also thankful to 
him for commenting on my views and helping me understand and enrich my 
ideas.  
I must also acknowledge to Büşra NUR for the long discussions that 
helped me sort out the technical details of my work. I am thankful to her for 
encouraging the use of correct grammar and consistent notation in my writings 
and for carefully reading and commenting on countless revisions of this 
manuscript. 
Most importantly, none of this would have been possible without the 
love and patience of my family. My immediate family, to whom this 
dissertation is dedicated to, has been a constant source of love, concern, 
support and strength all these years. I would like to express my heart-felt 
gratitude to my softhearted mother, pathfinder father and promoter sister. 
Where I am right now and I will be in the future are their sacrifices indeed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
  
 
 
   
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………v 
ÖZET………………………………………………………………………….vii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT……………………………………………………..ix 
TABLE OF CONTENTS……………………………………………………...xi 
LIST OF TABLES…………………………………………………………...xiii 
LIST OF FIGURES…………………………………………………………..xvi 
ABBREVATIONS………………………………………………………….xviii 
 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION........................................................................... 1 
 
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................... 4 
 
CHAPTER THREE: DATA ......................................................................................... 9 
 
           3.1. Shadow Funds Rate .................................................................................. 11 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY ..................................................................... 12 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS AND FINDINGS ....................................................... 14 
 
           5.1. Results of OLS Regression ....................................................................... 14 
 
           5.2. Results of Time Varying Regression ........................................................ 18 
 
xi 
  
 
 
   
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 26 
 
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................... 28 
 
APPENDIX A: Results of OLS Regression for Each Economy  ............................... 31 
 
           A.1. Pre-Crisis Period ...................................................................................... 31 
 
           A.2. Post-Crisis Period .................................................................................... 35 
 
APPENDIX B: The Graph of All Variebles of Dynamic Taylor Rule:  .................... 40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xii 
  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
 
Table 1:  Summary Results of OLS Regression and Chow Test .................................. 14 
Table 2: Interpretation of OLS Results for Each Economies ....................................... 17 
Table 3: Armenia ................................................................................................................ 31 
Table 4: Bulgaria ................................................................................................................. 31 
Table 5: Canada .................................................................................................................. 31 
Table 6: Czech Republic .................................................................................................... 31 
Table 7: Chile ...................................................................................................................... 32 
Table 8: Denmark................................................................................................................ 32 
Table 9: Israel ...................................................................................................................... 32 
Table 10: Croatia ................................................................................................................. 32 
Table 11: Iceland ................................................................................................................ 32 
Table 12: Japan .................................................................................................................... 32 
Table 13: Jordan .................................................................................................................. 33 
Table 14: Malaysia .............................................................................................................. 33 
Table 15: Norway ............................................................................................................... 33 
Table 16: Korea ................................................................................................................... 33 
xiii 
  
 
 
   
Table 17: Mexico ................................................................................................................ 33 
Table 18: Poland ................................................................................................................. 33 
Table 19: Romania .............................................................................................................. 34 
Table 20: Sweden ............................................................................................................... 34 
Table 21: Turkey ................................................................................................................. 34 
Table 22: Russia .................................................................................................................. 34 
Table 23: Tunisia................................................................................................................. 34 
Table 24: Ukraine ............................................................................................................... 34 
Table 25: India ..................................................................................................................... 35 
Table 26: Euro Area ........................................................................................................... 35 
Table 27: Armenia .............................................................................................................. 35 
Table 28: Bulgaria .............................................................................................................. 35 
Table 29: Canada ................................................................................................................ 36 
Table 30: Croatia ................................................................................................................. 36 
Table 31: Denmark ............................................................................................................. 36 
Table 32: Chile .................................................................................................................... 36 
Table 33: Czech Republic .................................................................................................. 36 
Table 34: Iceland ................................................................................................................. 36 
Table 35: Israel.................................................................................................................... 37 
Table 36: Jordan .................................................................................................................. 37 
Table 37: Malaysia ............................................................................................................. 37 
Table 38: Japan .................................................................................................................... 37 
Table 39: Korea ................................................................................................................... 37 
Table 40: Mexico ................................................................................................................ 37 
Table 41: Norway................................................................................................................ 38 
xiv 
  
 
 
   
Table 42: Romania .............................................................................................................. 38 
Table 43: Sweden ................................................................................................................ 38 
Table 44: Poland ................................................................................................................. 38 
Table 45: Russia .................................................................................................................. 38 
Table 46: Tunisia ................................................................................................................ 38 
Table 47: Turkey ................................................................................................................. 39 
Table 48: United Kingdom ................................................................................................ 39 
Table 49: Euro Area ............................................................................................................ 39 
Table 50: Ukraine ............................................................................................................... 39 
Table 51: India .................................................................................................................... 39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xv 
  
 
 
   
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The Movement of Shadow and Real Federal Funds Rate ............................ 11 
Figure 2: The Graph of Federal Funds Rate After Time Varying Regression for 
Each Economy .................................................................................................................... 18 
Figure 3: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Armenia ............................ 40 
Figure 4: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Bulgaria ............................ 41 
Figure 5: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Canada .............................. 42 
Figure 6: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Chile .................................. 43 
Figure 7: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Croatia .............................. 44 
Figure 8: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Czech Republic................ 45 
Figure 9: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Denmark ........................... 46 
Figure 10: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Euro Area ....................... 47 
Figure 11: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Iceland ............................ 48 
Figure 12: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to India ................................ 49 
Figure 13: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Israel ............................... 50 
Figure 14: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Japan ............................... 51 
Figure 15: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Jordan ............................. 52 
Figure 16: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Korea .............................. 53 
Figure 17: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Malaysia ......................... 54 
Figure 18: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Mexico ............................ 55 
xvi 
  
 
 
   
Figure 19: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Norway ........................... 56 
Figure 20: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Poland ............................. 57 
Figure 21: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Romania ......................... 58 
Figure 22: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Russia ............................. 59 
Figure 23: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Sweden ........................... 60 
Figure 24: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Tunisia ............................ 61 
Figure 25: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Turkey ............................ 62 
Figure 26: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Ukraine ........................... 63 
Figure 27: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to United Kingdom ............ 64 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xvii 
  
 
 
   
 
 
 
ABBREVATIONS 
 
 
 
CPI: The consumer price index 
GDP: Gross Domestic Product 
LGDP: Lag of Gross Domestic Product  
LCPI: Lag of Consumer Price Index 
MMR: Money Market Rate 
CBPR: Central Bank Policy Rate 
IFS: International Financial Statistics 
IMF: International Monetary Fund 
OECD: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
ZLB: Zero Lower Bound 
U.K.: United Kingdom 
U.S.: United States of America 
 
 
 
 
 
xviii 
1 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
There is no consensus among the economists about how to implement 
monetary policy. Some economists suggest that central banks should pursue a 
policy that fits their purpose by keeping track of the improvements constantly. 
This notion, especially accepted by Keynesian economists, is also known as 
Discretion Approach.  
Economists who are against the Discretion Approach support that 
central banks should carry out monetary policy according to the rules that were 
set beforehand. This notion, which means that monetary policy will be 
implemented automatically, is called Policy Rules Approach in literature.  
The petrol crisis that took place in the 1970s led to an increase in most 
of the macroeconomic indicators such as inflation and unemployment of many 
national economies. This situation forced the governments into intervention 
and along with this situation, differentiation in policy rules and discretion has 
begun to have its place in literature.  
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Those who support that different policies should be followed based on 
each circumstance due to the fact that the economic structures are in a state of 
flux find the implementation of discretion more reliable. In spite of that, those 
who put forward the idea that the financial environment will deteriorate even 
more with the intervention of politicians in monetary policy in the event that 
these policies are carried out support that specific rules should be followed.  
The first studies performed in favor of policy rules belong to Kydland 
& Prescott and Barro & Gordon. In these studies, it was put forward that 
politicians would want to keep unemployment rate under its natural level. What 
is more, unexpected economical shocks will be used for that. However, this 
practice has no chance of success under the rational expectations theory. A 
policy of this kind will cause the inflation to increase and the unemployment 
rate to remain the same in the long term. Therefore, to develop policy rules in 
order to avoid such a situation will be the best option that is available.  
Another point that is important is that economical shocks occur much 
less owing to the policy rules that are developed. By this way, economic units 
will be able to protect both themselves and the society from the cost that is 
likely to result from shocks.  
In the year 1993, John Taylor put forward a simple form of reaction 
function of central bank. This function, also known as the Taylor Rule, states 
that the short-term rate of interest will adapt to the income and inflation rate of 
economy in the simplest term (Mishkin, 2002). 
US Central Bank Federal Reserve, which is one of the most powerful 
economies in the world, has been using the federal funds rate as the primary 
3 
 
intervention tool since the beginning. In 1980s and 1990s, federal funds rate 
was in a co-movement with the policy rule put forward by Taylor in 1993. 
However, from the beginning of 2008, federal funds rate started to deviate 
from that policy rule (Gray, 2000). When it came to the year 2008, monetary 
policies conducted by major central banks lost their efficiency against the 
global crisis that broke out. US being in the first place, the most powerful 
economies resorted to monetary expansion by using quantitative easing 
method. As a result of this monetary expansion, federal funds rate came to zero 
lower bound.   
The most important issue that arouses curiosity in the light of these 
facts is how World Economic Outlook will be shaped after the normalization of 
the US economy. Whether or not the economies of other countries will be 
influenced as a result of FED's interest rate increase, and to what extent this 
influence will be in case it happens are matters of debate.  
This work consists of the following chapters: chapter two investigates 
and summarizes the findings of previous literature; chapter three provides 
information about the data and methodology applied and chapter four displays 
results and findings, and finally chapter five concludes the whole study. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
In the past, fixed exchange rate and constant monetary expansion used 
to be used as the main monetary policy. However, capital flow which is 
dependent on the volume of increasing interstate foreign trade caused 
malfunction in financial markets. As a result of this situation, old policy 
instruments have been replaced by the policies that show how central bank 
instruments can be adapted to the thriving economy (Ongan, 2004). For this 
reason, many researches which help estimate the changes in policy instruments 
have been made on central bank reaction function.  
Taylor constituted central bank reaction function in a very simple way 
in his study in 1993. In that study of his, Taylor examined the federal funds 
rate between the years 1987 - 1992 by approaching the US economy as a 
closed economy, and put forward that GDP gap and deviation of inflation from 
its expected value played a role in determining this interest rate. Taylor also 
claimed that this function in which policy interest is accepted based on 
deviation of inflation and GDP gap is a good policy proposal (Österholm, 
2003). 
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It is expected that Central Bank Reaction Functions are important tools 
which are used in order to evaluate the effects of exogenous economics shocks 
and other policy implements. After being published, Taylor Rule has been used 
so as to investigate the policy behaviors of central banks of many developed 
and developing countries. In these studies, Taylor Rules which have been 
expanded differently by addition of other independent variables were used 
instead of the original Taylor Rules. For instance, it was found useful to also 
add the exchange rate as a variable especially to the models created for open 
small economies. Ball (1999), Svensson (2001) and Taylor (2001) have 
obtained significant results in their studies by implementing this.  
In other studies, in which whether the exchange rate was meaningful as 
an independent variable was tested, Moura and Carvalho (2010) examined the 
most powerful seven economies of Latin America while Frömmel et al. (2011) 
examined six central and eastern European countries. In these studies, Moura 
and Carvalho showed the exchange rate-relevant variable for interest rate 
decisions only for Mexico while Frömmel et al. showed that the coefficient of 
the exchange rate is significant for Slovakia. 
According to some studies that have been carried out, the monetary 
policy which was suggested by Taylor in 1999 is not valid in the European 
countries. The study of Drumetz and Vendelhan can be given as an example to 
these studies. According to that study, Taylor Rule is not valid in France 
Economy either.  
Another dependent variable whose effect has been tested in some 
studies is political news and announcements from international institutions. In 
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highly indebted economies; some political news and announcements from 
international institutions may increase or reduce concerns about debt 
sustainability as well as having the possibility to influence asset prices. For 
instance, the fact that political news, IMF announcements and EU related news 
has an effect on secondary market government securities yields has been 
confirmed on the economy of Turkey (O.Y. Emir et al., 2007). 
In this context, another subject that is examined in literature is spillover 
effects and transmission mechanism. It has been suggested by several studies 
that the policies which countries carry out could have an influence on the 
macroeconomics indicators of other countries through various channels. For 
instance, Kim (2001) showed in his study that US monetary expansion has a 
positive spillover effect on non-US and G-6 output. 
Short-term interest rate, long term interest rate and exchange rate play 
an important role as transmission channels in literature. Takats and Vela put 
forward in their studies that US long term interest rate affects EMEs’ long term 
interest rates significantly while Francia and Verdu show that the long-term 
rate channel might have obtained a bigger role in the era following the crisis. 
On the other hand, Takats and Vela found evidence that policy rate responses 
became less important after 2008.  
The fact that monetary policies carried out by the countries have an 
influence on these relationships appear in literature. For instance, Takats and 
Vela showed again in the same study that the correlation between US and EME 
policy rates is more powerful for inflation targeting regimes than all EMEs 
taken together. In again the same study, the fact that in stable exchange rate 
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regimes with independent capital flow such as Hong Kong SAR, Saudi Arabia 
and the United Arab Emirates, the connection between advanced and EME 
policy rates is widely straight and self-regulating, and that in China, regardless 
of capital control and advancing liberalization of the exchange rate regime over 
the previous decade, the renminbi short-run interest rate has not deviated much 
from the US policy rate were shown as empirical results. 
The global crisis of 2008 caused the rule-like monetary policies, which 
was successfully implemented in 1980s and 1990s, to be questioned. The fact 
that the crisis broke out in the US and that it may have affected the other 
countries easily with its strong economy has intensified the researches on the 
US. 
It was inevitable that the low interest policy of the US would have an 
effect on other countries as well. As Bruno and Shin (2012) indicate in their 
study; the fact that a major central bank lowers its interest policy can increase 
risk-taking in other countries. So as to cope with this situation and to be able to 
compete with dollar which depreciated in the world market, other countries had 
to resort to interest rate cut as well. 
According to Hofmann and Bogdanova (2012); between 2002 and 
2006, the Federal Reserve set interest rates significantly below the rates 
suggested by well-known monetary policy rules that contributed to global 
liquidity boom. But empirical research of Ahrend (2010) and Hofmann and 
Bogdanova (2012) also shows that there were similar deviations at many other 
central banks as well. 
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The relationship between these deviations and how they changed before 
and after the crisis have started to be examined. For example, Taylor (2013) 
put forward a spillover amplification mechanism which can create even larger 
deviations from policy rules in his study. In the same study of his, he defends 
that struggles to prevent this interest rate outcome through currency 
intervention or capital controls produce extra adverse effects. 
Federal funds rate, which regressed to zero lower bound level towards 
the end of 2008 is expected to be increased again as a result of UE's economy's 
normalization. Recent studies are about the possible effect of this change on 
other countries. The impact of increased US interest rates on global interest 
rates is a matter of curiosity, because it is often argued that the degree of co-
movement in asset prices is increasing over time, driven by deeper integration 
of financial markets (Obstfeld et. al., 2010; Rey, 2015). 
The answer of this question is actually about to what extent other 
countries follow the US economy. So, this research attempts to address two 
main questions: 
1-) Do central banks react to the changes in monetary policy conducted 
by the FED? 
2-) Do the reaction of the central banks to the FED measured by the 
Taylor rule regression coefficient  change with respect to time (before 
and after financial crisis)? 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
DATA 
 
 
The main methodology of this study has been Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) and Time Varying OLS Model analysis for the following economies 
separately: Armenia, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Euro Area, Iceland, India, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine 
and the United Kingdom. In order to see the effects of 2008 financial crises on 
reaction of central banks to Federal Reserve at zero lower bound, four variables 
have been taken into consideration: inflation rate, interest rate, federal funds 
rate and output gap. Monthly CPI based percentage change series is evaluated 
for the calculation of inflation rates. Money market rates’ monthly series have 
been used for the interest rate variable for the following  countries: Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Iceland, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Sweden, Tunisia and Ukraine. On the other hand; in the case 
of Armenia, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Denmark, India, Israel, Norway and 
Turkey, Central Bank policy rate is used as interest rate variable. Shadow rates 
of Euro Area and the United Kingdom, which were calculated separately by 
10 
 
Cynthia Wu, were used as policy rate also. Data about the output gap has been 
calculated by using the monthly industrial production data through the 
application of Hodrick-Prescott filter.  
The last variable used in the model is federal funds rate. As known, it 
almost reached the zero lower bound in the middle of 2008. So as to preserve 
continuity and consistency, the shadow federal funds rate which is again 
calculated by Cynthia Wu is used for this variable.  
The data for inflation rates, interest rates and output gap for every 
economy, except India and Turkey, included in the analysis have been 
retrieved from the IFS database of IMF. On the other hand, interest rates of 
Turkey and India were retrieved from OECD Database. 
There are merely 25 economies which have been included in the 
analysis content because there is only high frequency data for only those 25 
countries in IFS database. Moreover, there is not enough data for some other 
countries in the IMF database and therefore those countries are not included in 
the analysis. 
While the data used in this study were generally ranging from January 
2000 to December 2013, there are some differences only for 5 countries. 
Whereas the data of Armenia starts from 2001 April and Ukraine from 2002 
January; those of Croatia ends in March 2013, Iceland in December 2012, and 
Sweden in 2014.  
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3.1. Shadow Funds Rate 
After the economy spiraled down in last global financial crisis, to 
stimulate  economic growth, the Fed taper the federal funds rate to near zero, 
known as the zero lower bound. Unable to move the short end of the yield 
curve, the Fed has started to conduct unconventional policies, such as its famed 
quantitative-easing bond-buying programs, to increase the money supply.But at 
this point federal funds rate does not have any meaning to understand these 
policies are effective or not. 
To capture the effectiveness of  these uncontional monetary policies, 
Wu and Xia suggest using a hybrid of the federal funds rate and this shadow 
rate. Shadow federal funds rate measure US monetary policy ceaselessly and 
consistently over time, from 1960 to the Great Recession, and into the future 
while the federal funds rate is not market sensitive at zero. 
 
Figure 1: The Movement of Shadow and Real Federal Funds Rate 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
This study is mainly concerned with whether central banks follow 
federal funds rate or not and to what extent this affects the financial crisis of 
2008. So as to investigate the answer to this question, reaction functions of 
central banks have been added to these functions as a variable and they have 
been formed in this way: 
𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑡
𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠
 
In our model which we formed as Backward-Looking Taylor Rule, 𝑖𝑡 
represents interest rate, 𝑦𝑡−1 lag of gdp gap, 𝜋𝑡−1 inflation rate, and 𝑖𝑡
𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠
 
shadow federal funds rate. By using gdp gap and inflation rate variable's lag, 
we tried to avoid endogeneity problem. The model was first analyzed with 
OLS and then with Time Varying OLS. 
In order to be able to test the effect of financial crisis of 2008 with OLS 
method, the data were first split into two groups as the starting dates until 2007 
December and the ending dates until 2008 January. In this way, the 
13 
 
significance level of the variable 𝑖𝑡
𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠
 and the weight of the coefficient 𝛽3 
and federal funds rate in reaction functions could be observed. 
So as to be able to compare the acquired results, data were once again 
analyzed with the help of OLS method without being split into two groups, and 
structural Break-Point Test (Chow Test) was applied on the final results. For 
the implementation of Chow Test, January 2008 was chosen as base point. 
Forming a model by accepting the variables as time-dependent also 
enables more realistic analyses to take place. In our model, Time Varying 
Regression Method was used in order to analyze how the relationship that is 
intended to be examined changes in time. This method and the time-varying 
coefficients of the Backward-Looking Taylor Rule are estimated by using 
unobserved components modelling and Kalman filter. The time varying 
coefficients are calculated by using maximum likelihood. The results obtained 
by this method will enable the crisis of 2008 to be observed more realistically, 
and be robustness for the results obtained by OLS. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
 
 
5.1. Results of OLS 
In order to investigate the effect that the financial crisis of 2008 had on 
the reaction functions of central banks, we had added the federal funds rate as 
an independent variable to the classical Backward-Looking Taylor Rule. The 
result of this model which has been formed by this way was analyzed by OLS, 
and the summary of these results are displayed in Table 1. 
Table 1: Summary Results of OLS Regression and Chow Test 
Country 2000-2007 2008-2014 Chow Test  
(2008M01) 
Armenia -1.254 
(4.31)** 
-0.310 
(4.08)** 
F-statistic      3,8367 
Prob.F(1,159)  0.052 
Bulgaria 0.016 
(0.28) 
0.777 
(4.41)** 
F-statistic    47.3379 
Prob.F(1,174)  0.000 
Canada 0.540 
(20.89)** 
0.276 
(5.74)** 
F-statistic    21.5136 
Prob.F(1,174)  0.000 
Chile 0.374 
(5.94)** 
-0.177 
(1.59) 
F-statistic    13,8209 
Prob.F(1,174)  0.000 
Croatia 0.249 
(1.49) 
1.599 
(4.04)** 
F-statistic    17.1729 
Prob.F(1,165)  0.000 
Czech Republic 0.088 
(1.66) 
0.678 
(12.38)** 
F-statistic      5.0413 
Prob.F(1,174)  0.026 
Denmark 0.277 
(7.26)** 
0.755 
(12.54)** 
F-statistic    36.4430 
Prob.F(1,174)  0.000 
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Tablo 1 (Continued) 
Euro Area 0.253 
(6.87)** 
0.912 
(12.95)** 
F-statistic    24.8549 
Prob.F(1,174)  0.000 
Iceland 0.838 
(3.45)** 
2.318 
(12.89)** 
F-statistic      3.9243 
Prob.F(1,151)  0.049 
India 0.236 
(9.37)** 
-0.707 
(7.73)** 
F-statistic    77.2340 
Prob.F(1,174)  0.000 
Israel 0.180 
(1.69) 
0.134 
(1.22) 
F-statistic      2.0748 
Prob.F(1,174)  0.152 
Japan 0.046 
(6.14)** 
0.088 
(26.36)** 
F-statistic    33.7243 
Prob.F(1,174)  0.000 
Jordan 0.678 
(24.82)** 
0.109 
(1.61) 
F-statistic    42.5987 
Prob.F(1,174)  0.000 
Korea 0.242 
(8.82)** 
0.241 
(3.28)** 
F-statistic      0.0010 
Prob.F(1,174)  0.974 
Malaysia 0.072 
(4.12)** 
-0.057 
(2.11)* 
F-statistic      5.9136 
Prob.F(1,174)  0.016 
Mexico 0.614 
(7.05)** 
0.887 
(16.52)** 
F-statistic      0.2727 
Prob.F(1,174)  0.602 
Norway 0.021 
(0.20) 
0.801 
(10.28)** 
F-statistic      6.9030 
Prob.F(1,174)  0.009 
Poland -0.308 
(1.72) 
0.273 
(3.29)** 
F-statistic      9.5597 
Prob.F(1,174)  0.002 
Romania -1.053 
(5.04)** 
2.277 
(9.06)** 
F-statistic    19.4995 
Prob.F(1,174)  0.000 
Russia -0.138 
(0.78) 
-1.383 
(5.57)** 
F-statistic      8.7405 
Prob.F(1,174)  0.004 
Sweden 0.086 
(2.59)* 
0.347 
(6.45)** 
F-statistic      3.5377 
Prob.F(1,172)  0.062 
Tunisia 0.057 
(2.59)* 
0.115 
(2.77)** 
F-statistic      0.0047 
Prob.F(1,174)  0.945 
Turkey 2.602 
(1.13) 
1.486 
(8.35)** 
F-statistic      0.2363 
Prob.F(1,174)0.628 
Ukranie -1.028 
(4.10)** 
-0.884 
(1.05) 
F-statistic      0.7656 
Prob.F(1,150)  0.383 
United Kingdom 0.372 
(12.98)** 
0.821 
(8.03)** 
F-statistic    16.7493 
Prob.F(1,174)  0.000 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
The data have been split into two groups since January 2008. OLS was 
applied on these data groups separately. Whereas the 1. column of the table 
displays the results of federal funds rate in pre 2008, the 2. column contains the 
results which belong to post-2008 period.  
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For the pre-2008 period, the shadow policy rate coefficient is 
significant at the 5% level for 17 economies. This coefficient is not statistically 
significant for 3 economies (Chile, Jordan, Ukraine) at the post-2008 period. 
Only 1 (Israel) of the 8 economies that are not statistically significant in 
pre-2008 period remains not being significant in post-2008 period as well. 
For 3 economies, whereas significance does not change between the 
periods pre-2008 and post-2008, the sign of coefficient changes. While India 
and Malaysia are significantly positive in pre-2008 period, they are 
significantly negative in post-2008 period. On the other hand, it is significantly 
negative for Romania during pre-2008 period, then it becomes significantly 
positive during post-2008 period. Both the change in significance and the 
change in the sign of coefficient demonstrate the change in the reaction of 
central banks to federal funds rate along with the crisis. 
The 3. column of Table 1 displays the results of all the data that belong 
to the Chow Test results. By also looking at these data, the breaking in the 
reserved reaction of central banks can be observed. For instance, while federal 
funds rate for Bulgaria in pre-2008 period is not significant; the reaction to this 
variable in post-2008 period is statistically significant. The Chow-test results 
which belong to this economy also confirm and support the results that there is 
a breakpoint in the federal funds rate of this model. 
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TABLE 2:  Interpretation of OLS Results for Each Economies 
Armenia It is negatively significant at 95% level both in pre and post 
crisis period. The effects of funds rate is higher in pre-crisis 
period. 
Bulgaria While it is insignificant at pre-crisis period, positively significant 
at 95% level in post-crisis period. 
Canada It is positively significant at 95% level in both pre and post crisis 
period. The effects of funds rate is higher in pre-crisis period. 
Chile While it is positively significant at 95% level in pre-crisis period, 
insignificant in post-crisis period. 
Croatia While it is insignificant at pre-crisis period, positively significant 
at 95% level in post-crisis period. 
Czech Republic While it is insignificant at pre-crisis period, positively significant 
at 95% level in post-crisis period. 
Denmark It is positively significant at 95% level in both pre and post crisis 
period. The effects of funds rate is higher in post-crisis period. 
Euro Area It is positively significant at 95% level both in pre and post crisis 
period. The effects of funds rate is higher in post-crisis period. 
Iceland It is positively significant at 95% level both in pre and post crisis 
period. The effects of funds rate is higher in post-crisis period. 
India While it is positively significant at 95% level in pre-crisis period, 
negatively significant at 95% level in post-crisis period. 
Israel It is insignificant  in both pre and post crisis period. 
Japan It is positively significant at 95% level in both pre and post crisis 
period. The effects of funds rate is higher in post-crisis period. 
Jordan While it is positively significant at 95% level in pre-crisis period, 
insignificant in post-crisis period. 
Korea It is positively significant at 95% level in both pre and post crisis 
period. The effects of funds rate is almost same in pre and post-
crisis period. 
Malaysia While it is positively significant at 95% level in pre-crisis period, 
negatively significant at 95% level in post-crisis period. 
Mexico It is positively significant at 95% level both in pre and post crisis 
period. The effects of funds rate is higher in post-crisis period. 
Norway While it is insignificant at pre-crisis period, positively significant 
at 95% level in post-crisis period. 
Poland While it is insignificant at pre-crisis period, positively significant 
at 95% level in post-crisis period. 
Romania While it is negatively significant at 95% level in pre-crisis 
period, positively significant at 95% level in post-crisis period. 
Russia While it is insignificant at pre-crisis period, negatively 
significant at 95% level in post-crisis period. 
Sweden It is positively significant at 95% level in both pre and post crisis 
period. The effects of funds rate is higher in post-crisis period. 
Tunisia It is positively significant at 95% level in both pre and post crisis 
period. The effects of funds rate is higher in post-crisis period. 
Turkey While it is insignificant at pre-crisis period, positively significant 
at 95% level in post-crisis period. 
Ukraine While it is negatively significant at 95% level in pre-crisis 
period, insignificant in post-crisis period. The effects of funds 
rate is higher in post-crisis period. 
United Kingdom It is positively significant at 95% level in pre and post period. 
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5.2. Results of Time Varying Regression 
The reaction of each economy to federal funds rate is displayed at Figure 2. 
While upper curve demonstrates the 68% significance level, lower curve 
demonstrates the 32% significance level and the curve at the middle 
demonstrates the mean of them at the same time in each figures.  
 
Figure 2: The Graph of Federal Funds Rate After Time Varying 
Regression for Each Economy 
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Figure 2 (Continued) 
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Figure 2 (Continued) 
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Figure 2 (Continued) 
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Figure 2 (Continued) 
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In case of Armenia, there has been an upward trend in impact of federal 
funds rate in pre-2008 period. After the financial crisis, this impact started 
being constant. However, due to this shock, the jump which took place under 
the influence of federal funds rate can be clearly observed. Owing to this jump, 
reaction to federal funds rate has started to have bigger value. 
In case of Bulgaria, the effect of federal funds rate which had a 
downward trend started to have bigger value by creating a big increment along 
with the economical shock. Besides, there was a local minimum in 2008, and 
the effect of federal funds rate started to increase after 2009.  
In case of Canada and Chile; although the reaction to federal funds rate 
had downward trend in both pre-crisis and post-crisis period, the big increase 
in 2008 was also clearly observable in the figure. Whilst there was a local 
minimum for Canada in 2008, local minimum for Chile was observable in 
2009.  
In case of Croatia and Euro Area; while the reaction to federal funds 
rate had downward trend, this trend has started to become upward in post-2008 
period. Reaction to federal funds rate was at its lowest level in 2009 for 
Croatia. Although effects of funds rate became the weakest in post-crisis 
period, it had a local minimum in 2009 for Euro Area 
In case of India; the reaction to federal funds rate was stable in both 
pre-2008 and post-2008 period. Although the value of coefficient of funds rate 
was almost zero in pre-crisis period, it decreased rapidly along with the 
economical shock of 2008. So, its negative effects could be observed well. 
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In case of Israel; the reaction to downward federal funds rate became 
upward in post-2008 period. In other words, the effects of federal funds rate 
had its lowest value in 2009.  
In case of Japan; while the reaction to federal funds rate was upward in 
pre-2008 period, this value started to become stable by decreasing during post-
2008 period. The effects of federal funds rate had its highest value in 2008. 
In case of Korea and the United Kingdom; whereas the reaction to 
federal funds rate was almost 0 in pre-2008 period, it increased to a large 
extent along with the financial crisis of 2008 and has maintained its positive 
effect during post-2008 period. Although there was almost no change in 
average of the value of the federal funds rate’s coefficient between the pre and 
post-crisis period for Korea; the average of this coefficient became higher in 
post-crisis period for United Kingdom. 
In case of Malaysia; the reaction to federal funds rate which was 
upward became downward along with the financial crisis of 2008. This 
reaction was the strongest in 2009. 
In case of Sweden; the reaction to federal funds rate which was 
downward became upward along with the financial crisis of 2008. This 
reaction was the weakest in 2009. 
In case of Mexico; the effect of federal funds rate which was downward 
started to have bigger value after the crisis increasingly. The reaction of federal 
funds rate was the weakest in 2007 and after this point it started to have 
upward trend. 
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In case of Norway; the effect of upward federal funds rate started to 
have less value decreasingly. In 2008; the value of coefficient of federal funds 
rate got its place at the pick point. Although it is decreasing after post-crisis 
period, it is never 0 and always takes positive value. 
In case of Romania; federal funds rate which had negative effect during 
pre-2008 period has started to have positive effect in post 2008 period. In 2008; 
the value of coefficient of federal funds rate got its lowest value. 
In case of Russia; the reaction to upward federal funds rate became 
downward along with the crisis of 2008. Although the sign of the coefficient of 
the federal funds rate did not change, it took its place at the highest level in 
near 2008. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Federal Reserve will keep on normalizing its monetary stance  as 
long as the US economic outlook reinforces. A number of market analysts and 
policymakers are concerned about the global inferences of the normalization of 
US monetary policy after several years of policy rates at the zero lower bound, 
improper operations, long-term rates and term premiums at historically low 
levels. The point that arouses curiosity is whether changes are international risk 
appetite to translate into macroeconomic unpredictability particularly after 
2008 or not.  
The influence of US monetary policy seems to have declined after 2008 
according to the results of this study which is carried out with the purpose of 
measuring federal reserve reactions of central banks and determining whether 
there has been a change in the reaction along with the 2008 financial crisis or 
not. 
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These important regression results do not necessarily indicate a loss of 
monetary policy independence in EMEs. As a matter of principle, EME central 
banks can select their short-term policy raters. The question is why they appear 
to pursue US monetary policy, a matter which is argued in the accompanying 
paper by Gadanecz, Miyajima and Urban (2014). Whereas this might be the 
case owing to the monetary spillovers, there are other explanations as well. For 
example, US monetary policy might take joint action with some common 
factors such as the prospects for the global business cycle and risk sensibility, 
which influence EMEs and advanced economies in the same way.  
In conclusion, we discover that a big part of the response of short-term 
interest rates to movements in US rates can be related to the synchronicity of 
business cycles across nations. On the other hand, we also discover that 
movements in US rates produce important spillovers to domestic short-term 
rates in various countries, both advanced and rising markets, above and beyond 
what can be clarified by standard business-cycle co-movement. Depending 
upon historical proof, those nations seem to have restricted monetary autonomy 
so as to cope with a situation or emerging policy rates in the United States. 
In brief, our results point out that EME policy rates act in unison with 
the US rate. What is more, these results are in agreement with central bank 
questionnaire responses as well. (Takats and Vela). The spillover impacts are 
likely to be dependent on country-specific factors which have not been 
sufficiently studied.  
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Appendix A: Results of OLS Regression for Each Economy 
A.1. For Pre-Crisis Period 
          
 
         * p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                     * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
Table 3: Armenia                           Table 5: Canada 
 
                
         * p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                       * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
Table 4: Bulgaria                                Table 6: Czech Republic 
 
 
 
 
 
 cbpr_arm 
lgdp_arm -0.036 
  (0.43) 
lcpi_arm -0.290 
 (1.87) 
shad -1.254 
 (4.31)** 
_cons 12.423 
 (10.62)** 
R2 0.21 
N 80 
 cbpr_can 
lgdp_can 0.008 
 (0.71) 
lcpi_can 0.285 
 (4.91)** 
shad 0.540 
 (20.89)** 
_cons 1.022 
 (6.34)** 
R2 0.86 
N 95 
 cbpr_bul 
 lgdp_bul 0.013 
 (0.89) 
lcpi_bul 0.133 
 (3.76)** 
Shad 0.016 
 (0.28) 
_cons 2.346 
 (11.41)** 
R2 0.23 
N 95 
 mmr_cze 
lgdp_cze -0.002 
 (0.13) 
lcpi_cze 0.586 
 (8.69)** 
shad 0.088 
 (1.66) 
_cons 1.461 
 (7.29)** 
R2 0.57 
N 95 
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    * p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                 * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
Table 7: Chile                                        Table 10: Croatia 
 
       
 
 
 
 
   * p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                          * p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                                   
Table 8: Denmark                             Table 11: Iceland                                         
 
 
      
 
       * p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                                  * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
Table 9: Israel                                   Table 12: Japan                              
 
 
 
 cbpr_chi 
lgdp_chi -0.009 
  (0.37) 
lcpi_chi 0.371 
 (4.00)** 
shad 0.374 
 (5.94)** 
_cons 1.689 
 (6.48)** 
R2 0.55 
N 95 
 mmr_cro 
lgdp_cro -0.014 
 (0.32) 
lcpi_cro 0.142 
 (0.55) 
shad 0.249 
 (1.49) 
_cons 2.549 
 (4.35)** 
R2 0.07 
N 95 
 cbpr_den 
lgdp_den 0.004 
 (0.56) 
lcpi_den 0.488 
 (4.09)** 
shad 0.277 
 (7.26)** 
_cons 1.108 
 (4.56)** 
R2 0.53 
N 95 
 mmr_ice 
lgdp_ice -0.133 
 (1.32) 
lcpi_ice 1.152 
 (4.82)** 
shad 0.838 
 (3.45)** 
_cons 2.181 
 (1.93) 
R2 0.41 
N 95 
 cbpr_isr 
lgdp_isr 0.053 
 (1.27) 
lcpi_isr 0.399 
 (4.72)** 
shad 0.180 
 (1.69) 
_cons 4.646 
 (10.50)** 
R2 0.22 
N 95 
 mmr_jap 
lgdp_jap 0.003 
 (1.23) 
lcpi_jap 0.084 
 (3.03)** 
shad 0.046 
 (6.14)** 
_cons -0.031 
 (1.02) 
R2 0.40 
N 95 
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       * p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                                  * p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                                   
Table 13: Jordan                                     Table 16: Korea                                   
 
  
   
 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                                  * p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                                   
Table 14: Malaysia                                   Table 17: Mexico                                    
     
 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                                  * p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                                   
Table 15: Norway                                Table 18: Poland                    
 
 
 
 mmr_jor 
lgdp_jor 0.007 
 (0.95) 
lcpi_jor 0.074 
 (3.24)** 
shad 0.678 
 (24.82)** 
_cons 1.626 
 (13.86)** 
R2 0.88 
N 95 
 mmr_kor 
lgdp_kor 0.020 
 (1.42) 
lcpi_kor 0.157 
 (2.66)** 
shad 0.242 
 (8.82)** 
_cons 2.947 
 (12.57)** 
R2 0.50 
N 95 
 mmr_msia 
lgdp_msia -0.017 
 (2.04)* 
lcpi_msia 0.111 
 (3.44)** 
shad 0.072 
 (4.12)** 
_cons 2.449 
 (34.73)** 
R2 0.36 
N 95 
 mmr_mex 
lgdp_mex -0.095 
 (1.65) 
lcpi_mex 1.425 
 (17.25)** 
shad 0.614 
 (7.05)** 
_cons -0.037 
 (0.09) 
R2 0.86 
N 95 
 cbpr_nor 
lgdp_nor 0.016 
 (0.58) 
lcpi_nor 0.825 
 (5.11)** 
shad 0.021 
 (0.20) 
_cons 4.648 
 (10.82)** 
R2 0.25 
N 95 
 mmr_pol 
lgdp_pol -0.093 
 (1.19) 
lcpi_pol 1.604 
 (14.50)** 
shad -0.308 
 (1.72) 
_cons 4.145 
 (6.92)** 
R2 0.74 
N 95 
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   * p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                                    * p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                                       
  Table 19: Romania                               Table 22: Russia                                
 
    
 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                                    * p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                                     
  Table 20: Sweden                               Table 23: Tunisia                            
   
 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                                    * p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                                     
Table 21: Turkey                            Table 24: Ukraine                            
 
 
 mmr_rom 
lgdp_rom 0.107 
 (1.23) 
lcpi_rom 0.977 
 (35.08)** 
shad -1.053 
 (5.04)** 
_cons 6.827 
 (8.02)** 
R2 0.93 
N 95 
 mmr_rus 
lgdp_rus 0.099 
 (1.11) 
lcpi_rus 0.425 
 (6.17)** 
shad -0.138 
 (0.78) 
_cons -0.316 
 (0.28) 
R2 0.30 
N 95 
 mmr_swe 
lgdp_swe 0.001 
 (0.23) 
lcpi_swe 0.779 
 (10.67)** 
shad 0.086 
 (2.59)* 
_cons 1.751 
 (10.16)** 
R2 0.56 
N 95 
 mmr_tun 
lgdp_tun 0.015 
 (1.45) 
lcpi_tun -0.117 
 (3.30)** 
shad 0.057 
 (2.59)* 
_cons 5.560 
 (42.30)** 
R2 0.17 
N 95 
 cbpr_tur 
lgdp_tur -0.250 
 (0.32) 
lcpi_tur 0.796 
 (3.93)** 
shad 2.602 
 (1.13) 
_cons 6.876 
 (0.67) 
R2 0.17 
N 95 
 mmr_ukr 
lgdp_ukr 0.119 
 (2.02)* 
lcpi_ukr 0.078 
 (0.87) 
shad -1.028 
 (4.10)** 
_cons 7.173 
 (9.24)** 
R2 0.26 
N 71 
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* p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                                    * p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                                     
Table 25: India                                        Table 26: Euro Area 
 
                       
A.2. For Post-Crisis Period 
   
 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                                    * p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                                     
Table 27:Armenia                                Table 28:Bulgaria                                        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 cbpr_ind 
lgdp_ind 0.006 
 (0.33) 
lcpi_ind -0.289 
 (8.03)** 
shad 0.236 
 (9.37)** 
_cons 6.901 
 (43.04)** 
R2 0.56 
N 95 
 cbpr_ecb 
lgdp_ecb 0.254 
 (5.88)** 
lcpi_ecb 0.382 
 (1.94) 
shad_fed 0.253 
 (6.87)** 
_cons 1.394 
 (3.09)** 
R2 0.66 
N 95 
 cbpr_arm 
lgdp_arm 0.007 
 (0.95) 
lcpi_arm 0.090 
 (2.66)** 
shad -0.310 
 (4.08)** 
_cons 6.586 
 (26.83)** 
R2 0.21 
N 83 
 cbpr_bul 
lgdp_bul 0.014 
 (0.80) 
lcpi_bul 0.134 
 (2.34)* 
shad 0.777 
 (4.41)** 
_cons 1.299 
 (3.59)** 
R2 0.75 
N 83 
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* p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                                    * p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                                     
Table 29:Canada                                  Table 32:Chile                               
 
          
 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                                    * p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                                     
Table 30:Croatia                            Table 33:Czech Republic                             
 
 
     
 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                                    * p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                                     
Table 31:Denmark                              Table 34:Iceland                                
 
 
 cbpr_can 
lgdp_can 0.060 
 (2.93)** 
lcpi_can 0.173 
 (2.22)* 
shad 0.276 
 (5.74)** 
_cons 1.152 
 (7.43)** 
R2 0.45 
N 83 
 cbpr_chi 
lgdp_chi 0.070 
 (2.64)** 
lcpi_chi 0.554 
 (10.60)** 
shad -0.177 
 (1.59) 
_cons 2.136 
 (8.11)** 
R2 0.65 
N 83 
 mmr_cro 
lgdp_cro -0.104 
 (1.76) 
lcpi_cro 0.080 
 (0.32) 
shad 1.599 
 (4.04)** 
_cons 3.468 
 (3.61)** 
R2 0.33 
N 74 
 mmr_cze 
lgdp_cze 0.006 
 (0.96) 
lcpi_cze 0.110 
 (2.79)** 
shad 0.678 
 (12.38)** 
_cons 1.786 
 (12.92)** 
R2 0.88 
N 83 
 cbpr_den 
lgdp_den 0.020 
 (2.14)* 
lcpi_den 0.223 
 (2.73)** 
shad 0.755 
 (12.54)** 
_cons 1.263 
 (6.12)** 
R2 0.83 
N 83 
 mmr_ice 
lgdp_ice 0.042 
 (2.15)* 
lcpi_ice 0.504 
 (10.24)** 
shad 2.318 
 (12.89)** 
_cons 5.192 
 (11.39)** 
R2 0.93 
N 60 
37 
 
       
 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                                    * p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                                     
Table 35:Israel                                          Table 38:Japan                               
     
 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                                    * p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                                     
Table 36:Jordan                                     Table 39:Korea                                 
   
 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                                    * p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                                     
Table 37:Malaysia                                    Table 40:Mexico                                     
 
 
 cbpr_isr 
lgdp_isr 0.033 
 (2.21)* 
lcpi_isr 0.348 
 (3.28)** 
shad 0.134 
 (1.22) 
_cons 1.088 
 (3.01)** 
R2 0.41 
N 83 
 mmr_jap 
lgdp_jap 0.003 
 (6.13)** 
lcpi_jap 0.037 
 (11.29)** 
shad 0.088 
 (26.36)** 
_cons 0.199 
 (38.11)** 
R2 0.91 
N 83 
 mmr_jor 
lgdp_jor 0.021 
 (1.11) 
lcpi_jor 0.100 
 (5.37)** 
shad 0.109 
 (1.61) 
_cons 2.954 
 (18.67)** 
R2 0.43 
N 83 
 mmr_kor 
lgdp_kor 0.046 
 (3.60)** 
lcpi_kor 0.236 
 (3.09)** 
shad 0.241 
 (3.28)** 
_cons 2.393 
 (8.92)** 
R2 0.50 
N 83 
 mmr_msia 
lgdp_msia 0.038 
 (4.34)** 
lcpi_msia 0.139 
 (7.66)** 
shad -0.057 
 (2.11)* 
_cons 2.453 
 (36.98)** 
R2 0.51 
N 83 
 mmr_mex 
lgdp_mex 0.060 
 (2.86)** 
lcpi_mex 0.387 
 (4.47)** 
shad 0.887 
 (16.52)** 
_cons 4.286 
 (10.72)** 
R2 0.86 
N 83 
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* p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                                    * p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                                     
Table 41:Norway                                    Table 44:Poland                                
 
 
 
  
 
 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                                    * p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                                     
Table 42:Romania                                   Table 45:Russia                                
 
 
  
 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                                    * p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                                     
Table 43:Sweden                                   Table 46:Tunisia                                
 
  
 
 cbpr_nor 
lgdp_nor 0.000 
 (0.03) 
lcpi_nor 0.419 
 (4.31)** 
shad 0.801 
 (10.28)** 
_cons 2.176 
 (8.39)** 
R2 0.76 
N 83 
 mmr_pol 
lgdp_pol 0.030 
 (2.15)* 
lcpi_pol 0.353 
 (4.92)** 
shad 0.273 
 (3.29)** 
_cons 2.952 
 (10.86)** 
R2 0.58 
N 83 
 mmr_rom 
lgdp_rom -0.042 
 (1.45) 
lcpi_rom -0.008 
 (0.06) 
shad 2.277 
 (9.06)** 
_cons 8.019 
 (9.12)** 
R2 0.71 
N 83 
 mmr_rus 
lgdp_rus -0.019 
 (0.51) 
lcpi_rus 0.624 
 (5.86)** 
shad -1.383 
 (5.57)** 
_cons -0.772 
 (0.70) 
R2 0.33 
N 83 
 mmr_swe 
lgdp_swe 0.014 
 (1.98) 
lcpi_swe 0.507 
 (10.27)** 
shad 0.347 
 (6.45)** 
_cons 1.293 
 (11.99)** 
R2 0.82 
N 81 
 mmr_tun 
lgdp_tun 0.015 
 (1.30) 
lcpi_tun 0.124 
 (2.04)* 
shad 0.115 
 (2.77)** 
_cons 3.964 
 (14.01)** 
R2 0.17 
N 83 
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* p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                                    * p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                                     
Table 47:Turkey                                 Table 50:Ukraine                                
   
 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                                    * p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                                     
Table 48:United Kingdom               Table 51:India                           
 cbpr_ecb 
lgdp_ecb 0.304 
 (9.61)** 
lcpi_ecb -0.719 
 (5.69)** 
shad_fed 0.912 
 (12.95)** 
_cons 2.608 
 (9.36)** 
R2 0.78 
N 83 
  * p<0.05; ** p<0.01                                                     
Table 49:Euro Area             
 cbpr_tur 
lgdp_tur 0.002 
 (0.05) 
lcpi_tur 0.835 
 (6.57)** 
shad 1.486 
 (8.35)** 
_cons 2.870 
 (2.61)* 
R2 0.64 
N 83 
 mmr_ukr 
lgdp_ukr -0.097 
 (1.02) 
lcpi_ukr 0.404 
 (3.14)** 
shad -0.884 
 (1.05) 
_cons 4.759 
 (2.35)* 
R2 0.15 
N 83 
 cbpr_uk 
lgdp_uk 0.087 
 (2.88)** 
lcpi_uk 0.361 
 (2.66)** 
shad 0.821 
 (8.03)** 
_cons 0.366 
 (0.81) 
R2 0.57 
N 83 
 cbpr_ind 
lgdp_ind -0.018 
 (0.74) 
lcpi_ind -0.099 
 (1.88) 
shad -0.707 
 (7.73)** 
_cons 7.591 
 (14.30)** 
R2 0.46 
N 83 
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Appendix B: The Graph of All Variebles of Dynamic Taylor Rule 
 
Figure 3: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Armenia 
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Figure 4: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Bulgaria 
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Figure 5: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Canada 
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Figure 6: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Chile 
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Figure 7: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Croatia 
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Figure 8: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Czech Republic 
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Figure 9: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Denmark 
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Figure 10: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Euro Area 
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Figure 11: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Iceland 
49 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to India 
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Figure 13: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Israel 
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Figure 14: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Japan 
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Figure 15: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Jordan 
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Figure 16: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Korea 
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Figure 17: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Malaysia 
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Figure 18: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Mexico 
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Figure 19: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Norway 
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Figure 20: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Poland 
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Figure 21: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Romania 
 
59 
 
 
Figure 22: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Russia 
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Figure 23: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Sweden 
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Figure 24: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Tunisia 
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Figure 25: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Turkey 
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Figure 26: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to Ukraine 
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Figure 27: Results of Time Varying Regression Belong to United Kingdom 
